

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA  
MONROE DIVISION

**DARIUS JENKINS  
LA. DOC #558149**  
VS.

**CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-cv-1739  
SECTION P**

**SHERIFF MIKE TUBBS, ET AL.** **MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES**

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

*Pro se* plaintiff Darius Jenkins, proceeding *in forma pauperis*, filed the instant civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on May 20, 2015. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of Louisiana's Department of Corrections (DOC); he is currently housed at the Catahoula Correctional Center, but he complains that he was assaulted by an employee of the Morehouse Parish Detention Center (MPDC) when he was incarcerated there in February 2015. Plaintiff sues Morehouse Parish Sheriff Mike Tubbs and MPDC Warden Ike Brown; he demands compensatory damages and a transfer to another facility. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of the Court. For the following reasons it is recommended that the complaint be **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

***Statement of the Case***

On February 22, 2015, plaintiff was a DOC inmate housed at MPDC. At approximately 10:25 p.m., Deputy Fudge came to plaintiff's dormitory dispensing medication to the inmates. According to plaintiff, Fudge assaulted him. Fudge was "written up" by his supervisor Dy. Sgt.

Clack and the incident was thereafter reported to the medical staff at MPDC and recorded in plaintiff's medical records. Plaintiff submitted a grievance and was thereafter transferred to the Morehouse Parish Jail. Sometime in mid-August, 2015, plaintiff was transferred to his present place of confinement.

### ***Law and Analysis***

#### ***1. Screening***

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis*. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *See Martin v. Scott*, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, his complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2) (B) and § 1915A(b) provide for *sua sponte* dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” *Id.* at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); *accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

#### ***2. Failure to Protect***

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to compensatory damages from the Sheriff of

Morehouse Parish and the Warden of the MPDC because they failed to protect him from harm at the hands of one of their deputies while in their custody. Plaintiff's claim is governed by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and is measured by the standard of subjective deliberate indifference enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under that standard, a prison official is not liable for failing to protect an inmate unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). In order to prevail plaintiff must establish that the defendant officials: (1) were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and, (2) actually drew the inference. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837. Negligent inaction can never be the basis of a failure to protect claim. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835.

The legal conclusion of deliberate indifference must rest on facts clearly evincing "wanton" actions on the part of defendants. *Johnson v. Treen*, 759 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir.1985). In *Smith v. Wade*, 461 U.S. 30, 39 n. 8, 103 S.C. 1625, 1632 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983), the Court approved the following definition of wanton: "'Wanton means reckless – without regard to the rights of others ... Wantonly means causelessly, without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others. Wantonness is defined as a licentious act of one man towards the person of another, without regard to his rights; it has also been defined as the conscious failure by one charged with a duty to exercise due care and diligence to prevent an injury after the discovery of the peril, or under circumstances where he is charged with a knowledge of such peril, and being conscious of the inevitable or probable results of such failure.' 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 2-4 (2d ed. 905) (footnotes omitted)."

Nothing in plaintiff's complaint suggests that the defendants were guilty of deliberate indifference with regard to the complained of assault. Nothing suggests that these defendants were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed prior to the assault. Additionally, in considering whether defendants have failed to protect an inmate, Courts must look to whether there was a "substantial" or "pervasive" risk of harm preceding the assault. A "pervasive" risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single or isolated incident. *See e.g. Falls v. Nesbitt*, 966 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir.1992) (holding a "pervasive risk" is something more than a single incident and something less than a riot). Here plaintiff alleged no facts to suggest that the attack on him was at all foreseeable; indeed, he himself suggests that the assault was unforeseeable. Inmates are unlikely to recover under Section 1983 for injuries sustained in an isolated assault unless they can prove that the authorities either "set him up" for the assault or deliberately ignored his repeated and clearly well-founded claims of danger. There are no allegations that the defendants set plaintiff up for the attack or ignored specific claims of danger prior to the attack. The facts alleged do not demonstrate that the defendants inferred that plaintiff was at risk of an event such as the one complained of. Finally, as noted above, it does not appear that the attack was a foreseeable consequence of any violations of prison policy. Therefore, plaintiff's failure to protect claim is frivolous and fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

### **3. *Supervisory Liability***

Plaintiff faults the Sheriff and Warden for the alleged fault of their employee. However, "[s]upervisory officials may be held liable only if: (i) they affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivations; and (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result

in plaintiff's injuries." *Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex.*, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir.1992), *cert. denied*, 508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660 (1993). "Vicarious liability does not apply to § 1983 claims." *Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div.*, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1107, 115 S.Ct. 1957, 131 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995). "Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action." *Thompson v. Steele*, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 248, 78 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). In other words, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to sue the Sheriff and the Warden in their supervisory capacities, he must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate either personal involvement or the implementation of unconstitutional policies by these defendants. This he has not done and his complaint thus fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

***Conclusion and Recommendation***

Therefore,

**IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT** plaintiff's civil rights complaint be **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

**Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen**

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error.

*See, Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).*

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, September 18, 2015.

  
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KAREN L. HAYES  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE